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 It is difficult to find any other notion than “globalisation” which would be 
used so often and which would have so many interpretations. For political scien-
tists it means first of all increasing democratisation of the world. Russia came out 
of the USSR with the only one desire to become part of the civilised world and 
consequently of the main international institutions. Nowadays, ten years after the 
dissolution of the USSR, Russia still stays outside the main international institu-
tions. The gap between Russia and enlarging Europe is growing. Why did it hap-
pen? What are the underlying reasons of this situation? The presentation is fo-
cused on these problems. 
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 Globalisation as an inclusive strategy  
 It is difficult to find any notion other than “globalisation” which would be used so 
often and which would have so many interpretations. For a long time globalisation was 
analysed mostly in terms of market economy as the source of contemporary history.  
 The post-Cold war history showed that this process has many other aspects. For 
political scientists it primarily means l increasing democratisation of the world and for 
strategic community sustaining peace and fighting international terrorism by joint ef-
forts of all the concerned countries regardless of their different cultures. In this respect 
regional democratisation is part of global democratisation. The most impressive exam-
ple of regional democratisation is the European integration enhanced by the end of bi-
polarity. 
 Russia came out of the USSR with the only one desire to become part of the civi-
lised world and consequently of the main international institutions. Nowadays, ten years 
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after the dissolution of the USSR, Russia is still outside the main international institu-
tions. The gap between Russia and the enlarging Europe is growing.  
 
 European integration as an integral part of globalisation  
 In spite of powerful impulses encouraging the development of strategic partnership 
relations between Russia and the European Union their future relations are largely de-
termined by the success Russia will achieve in its domestic system transformation, on 
the one hand, and by the final results of the in-depth transformation of the European 
Union, on the other. The uncertainty surrounding the process of future democratic and 
socioeconomic transformations in Russia is viewed as the main hindrance in the rela-
tions between Russia and the European Union. Since the 1990s Europe has had serious 
apprehensions about the prospects of a democratic reform in Russia. All those appre-
hensions have caused many other problems in the relations between Russia and the 
European Union: absence of strategic goals in the relations between Russia and the 
European Union is resulting in the growing gap between the unifying Europe and Rus-
sia. The absence of any long-term concept of the relations between Russia and the 
European Union and the strategic objectives determining their current policies is viewed 
as the main obstacle preventing Russia and the European Union from working out the 
principles of effective policy with regard to one another. 
 Apparently both Russia and the European Union do not have Russia’s accession to 
the EU on their agendas because neither party is prepared to meet with such a contin-
gency. This issue, however, is frequently debated theoretically, and it has its advocates 
and opponents both in Russia and in the EU countries, Russia’s enormous size being 
one of the principal arguments against Russia’s membership in the European Union: it 
will “always be too large for Europe.” 
 The advocates of Russia’s gradual integration into European structures contend, 
however, that based on its economic potential, its demographic trends and the evolution 
of its armed forces, Russia may soon be rated as an average European country. There-
fore, they maintain, the main condition should be its conformity with the Copenhagen 
criteria rather than its size.  
 At this point Russia and the EU countries have not developed the same approach to 
the model of their partnership. The existing divergence of views, however, may be re-
duced to two primary options: “selective cooperation between Russia and the EU” 
(peaceful coexistence) on the basis of the existing legislation, first and foremost, in 
compliance with the provisions of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), 
or strategic partnership with Russia on the basis of a new agreement, such as a special 
Agreement on Russia’s Association with the EU.  
 The 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) is the primary legal docu-
ment determining the relations between Russia and the EU. In the meantime, the rela-
tions between Russia and the EU in the political sphere have long gone beyond the lim-
its outlined by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. As regards the sphere of 
economic cooperation, in spite of a major progress made in that direction, neither Rus-
sia nor the EU have realized in full the potential of the PCA. Admittedly, some of the 
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provisions of the Agreement are outdated; others are not observed by either party. This 
classification applies to 64 articles of the said Agreement. 
 The absence of strategic goals in the relations between Russia and the EU also mani-
fested itself in the Strategies adopted in 1999 by the EU and Russia with respect to one 
another following the Kosovo crisis, although their significance was largely symbolic. 
 The advocates of the so-called “selective cooperation” both in Russia and in the 
European Union contend that the parties ought to take a full advantage of the potentials 
contained in the 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement by way of “forcibly” 
putting to use the currently inactive articles and provisions of the Agreement without 
proposing any new big-scale initiatives.  
 The other view shared by various people both in the EU and in Russia purports that 
in view of widening and deepening of the European integration and considering the new 
threats and challenges to European security the relations between Russia and the EU 
should be brought to a higher new level of cooperation which the 1997 Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement cannot provide. Such new level of cooperation could be at-
tained through an Agreement on Establishing a Special Association between the Russian 
Federation and the European Union. This goal fully meets long-term interests of both 
Europe and Russia. On the one hand, such an Agreement on Association per se does not 
imply Russia’s aspiration to join the EU as its member. On the other hand, such an 
agreement would provide a solid legal basis for the relations evolving between the EU 
and Russia. It would contribute to the convergence of Russian and EU political, eco-
nomic and legal systems; enhance sustainable development of their economies; promote 
further development of democracy in Russia, and ensure closer cooperation of the par-
ties in all directions including security measures. The “special association” implies that 
the EU agreement with Russia draws a line between this and other agreements on asso-
ciation regarding Russia’s importance and status, its role in the termination of the “cold 
war,” as well as its input in the antiterrorist coalition. Undoubtedly, an Agreement on 
Association per se won’t resolve all problems in the EU-Russia relations but together 
with some other measures and programs such an agreement would bridge the existing 
gap between the unifying Europe and Russia, which is likely to lead to the emergence of 
a new dividing line on the European continent. 
 The success of a future partnership between Russia and the European Union will de-
pend on the impact which the processes of widening and deepening of the European in-
tegration, first and foremost, its institutional transformations in the enlarged European 
Union, will have on its viability and its efficiency as Europe’s primary international in-
stitution.  
 Both the widening and deepening of the European integration (especially in the 
spheres of defense and security) ought to include a Russian dimension which implies a 
comprehensive series of programs and measures aimed at bridging the gap between the 
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 Democracy versus stability 
 The uncertainty regarding the prospects of Russian democracy seems to have been 
induced by the following three factors. First, by the stereotypes juxtaposing the Russian 
and the European values as incompatible. But on many occasions – beginning with the 
August coup d’etat in 1991 and ending with Russia’s participation in the anti-terrorist 
coalition in 2001 – Russians proved that their values are rooted in European values. 
Second, by the Soviet syndrome which means that the West and some of the post-com-
munist countries don’t see any difference between Russia and the USSR. It is worth-
while to remind that the USSR would not have collapsed so quickly without the efforts 
of Russian democrats, and Russia’s economic and political fabric differs from that of 
the USSR. Third, by the mistakes made by the Russian leaders in the past decade (the 
use of force for resolving Russia’s internal political crisis in October 1993; the war in 
Chechnya; imposition of controlled democracy) which impelled Europe to question 
Russia’s adherence to democratic principles. This third factor really matters. But the EU 
countries, as well as Western countries as a whole, however, were not impartial observ-
ers and they often showed neglectful and cynical attitude toward Russia’s vested inter-
ests. On the one hand, they ignored the premise that Russian democracy could only suc-
ceed under the conditions of favorable external environment instilled by them; on the 
other, they showed distrust in the future democratic transformations in Russia giving 
preference to stability rather than democracy in Russian society. A US president once 
remarked that nations, which prefer stability to democracy, fail to get both nor do they 
deserve any stability and democracy. Well, this is true of both Russia and the West at 
this stage.  
 In October 1993 Yeltsin’s regime spilled first blood in Russia’s post-cornmunist his-
tory, exceeding permissible boundaries in its struggle against the opposition and breed-
ing all subsequent problems, e.g. the victory of conservatives and nationalists in the 
course of the December 1993 parliamentary elections, an obviously authoritarian presi-
dential constitution, the first Chechen war and lots more, the notorious “family” in-
cluded. In fact, the degeneration of Yeltsin’s regime started precisely in October 1993. 
Russia, which should not shift responsibility for its own sins on someone else, nonethe-
less ought to admit that the West didn't just stand idly by. One can only guess how Rus-
sia would have developed, if Bill Clinton and Helmut Kohl hadn’t supported Boris 
Yeltsin, and had they not turned a blind eye on Russian radical democrats’ unconstitu-
tional actions in the name of “market reforms” and democracy. The October 1993 
events have confirmed an old wisdom to the effect that any particular goal doesn't jus-
tify the means for attaining it. The West, which had sided with those specific persons, 
who called themselves democrats, or who had the reputation of being democrats in the 
past, has thus fallen hostage to them and their mistakes. Unlike Russian public at large, 
the West showed understanding for the first Chechen war, evidently expecting a quick 
victory on the Kremlin's part. In fact, that victory was perceived by Yeltsin as some-
thing vitally important in the context of strengthening his domestic position. However, 
the Chechen war alone, which was virtually approved by the leading Western countries 
at first, subsequently came to be regarded by Europe and the United States as yet an-
other evidence of Russian unpredictability and as one of the arguments favoring 
NATO’s eastward expansion.  
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 In other words, the West continued to back Yeltsin's weakening regime (that was 
still considered to be democratic or the best possible option on Russian territory), also 
erecting a new European border for safety's sake, so as to counter any unforeseen devel-
opments. Official NATO circles used to justify their bloc's eastward expansion in every 
possible way, stressing that this process was not spearheaded against Russia. However, 
all those incoherent and contradictory explanations on the part of NATO's leadership 
only served to increase suspicions concerning the genuine goals of such expansion that 
were voiced by the Russian political elite and the intelligence (strategic) community. As 
we look back in time, we can safely say that Russia's relations with NATO and the West 
had mostly evolved in line with the logic of self-fulfilling prophecies. Apart from that, 
the Kosovo crisis had virtually proven that the West didn't view Russia as a full-fledged 
partner.  
 
Domestic and foreign policy challenges to democratisation in the 
post-Yeltsin Russia 
 Parallelly with assessing the current trends and options in Russia’s relations with the 
United States, NATO and the EU, one cannot ignore the way Russia itself will be 
evolving. In all countries foreign and domestic policies go hand in hand. In Russia this 
interdependence is especially acute. The very beginning of the ‘anti-terrorist’ coopera-
tion immediately had a strong positive impact on Russia’s domestic situation. It 
changed the balance of forces in Putin’s entourage in favour of liberals. Moscow had to 
start political negotiations on Chechnya, and on 18 Nov. 2001 representatives of Presi-
dent Putin and Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov had a meeting at Moscow’s inter-
national airport. The roots of these positive changes are understandable—being ‘on 
board’ means behaving according to the commonly recognised rules, while being kept 
at ‘arm’s-length’ allows one to play according to one’s own rules and interests. When it 
became clear that the anticipated breakthrough in Russian–Western relations was not in 
fact happening, some of these positive trends were reversed or frozen: no progress to-
wards a political solution of the Chechen problem, new attacks on independent mass 
media (the TV-6 case), new spy scares, and a growing anti-Westernism among the Rus-
sian political elite. All these processes are evolving parallelly with the Kremlin’s en-
deavours to continue the anti-terrorist cooperation and to develop Russia’s relations 
with the EU and NATO. 
 To a large extent this situation can be explained by the fact that Vladimir Putin has 
not created a solid political foundation for his foreign policy course. Moreover, he has 
launched most of these trends himself, having come uo with a strategy guided by three 
incompatible goals: a ‘strong state’ based on ‘controlled democracy’; liberal economic 
reforms; and good relations with the West. The restoration of ‘vertical power’ (the So-
viet-like federal centre) by means of ‘controlled democracy’(political squeeze on any 
opposition) for the sake of economic reforms is not a viable strategy in Russia. True, in 
Chile, South Korea and Taiwan economic reforms have been ushered in by authoritarian 
regimes with a strong element of state support and planning. But Russia is too big a 
country to stop the authoritarian trend at the right point and at the right moment. This 
approach, too, is incompatible with good relations with the West, since ‘controlled de-
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mocracy’ cannot exist without an external enemy. From this point of view, 11 Septem-
ber has been ‘a defining moment’ not only for Russia’s foreign policy but for Putin’s 
previous controversial policies based on bureaucratic consensus. It is very telling that 
Putin’s foreign policy since 11 September has been supported by Russian democrats, 
who are the most consistent opponents of ‘the controlled democracy’ concept, and has 
not been backed by thesupporters of the strong state and controlled democracy. The 
need to correct Putin’s strategy is obvious; the key question is: which of three elements 
will be changed? 
 Ironically, Putin’s ‘strong hand’ strategy was accepted not only by Russians but by 
the West itself. Both Europe and the United States were tired of the roller-coaster of 
Russia’s evolution under Yeltsin and viewed Putin as a leader capable of ensuring Rus-
sia’s domestic and external stability (even if this was achieved by limiting democracy to 
some extent). Having preferred stability to democracy, the West unwillingly gave a 
green light to the trends which are now being perceived as obstacles to Russia’s inte-
gration into the Euro-Atlantic space of cooperation after 11 September. 
 The primary responsibility for Russia’s future rests with Russians, and it is for Rus-
sia to decide which was the aberration in its history—either the seventy years of the 
communist rule or the one decade of its independence (however controversial it was). 
The leading countries of the West can support democracy in Russia, not so much by fi-
nancial aid or a deep involvement in Russia’s domestic affairs, but more by creating a 
benign international environment for its democratic evolution. The post-11 September 
cooperation, if it could be transformed into a partnership, would offer this chance. But 
democratisation still remains the major precondition for Russia’s integration into the 
Euro-Atlantic arena of cooperation. If there had been no regression in the process of 
Russia’s democratic evolution in recent years, the division between Russia and the West 
would have been erased for ever, and Moscow would have had more chances to be in-
cluded in the integrational processes developing in Europe.  
 Both Russia and the West are being faced with a paradox in their relations: on the 
one hand, Russia’s democratisation is the necessary precondition for its integration into 
Europe’s main institution, and on the other hand, democratisation of Russia cannot be 
acheived without Russia’s integration into Europe. There is only one solution – to de-
velop both processes hand in hand. 
